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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, IndyMac, a large bank located in California, was nearly
insolvent when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
decided to take control.' John F. Bovenzi, the federal regulator placed
in charge of IndyMac, recounts the FDIC making many important
decisions regarding creditors' interests "[olver a single weekend."2 The
difficulties in making prompt decisions about complex subject matter,
such as derivatives contracts, became apparent.3  Bovenzi goes on,
"[i]magine trying to undertake such an exercise at any of the nearly 30
much larger and much more complex American financial institutions.'
In the heart of the 2008 financial crisis, the difficulties in unwinding the
large interconnected structures of some of the major financial
institutions like American International Group, Inc. and Lehman
Brothers Holding, Inc. (Lehman Brothers) became clear.5  The shock
waves sent through the economy after Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy
and the government bailouts of other companies revealed a lack of
preparation for the unwinding of these failed financial institutions. 6
One way Congress responded to these resolution problems was
§ 165(d) of The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
1. John F. Bovenzi, Another View: Why Banks Need 'Living Wills', N.Y. TIMES





5. See, e.g., Victoria McGrane, 'Living Wills' Due Next Year, Deadline in 2012 for
Banks to Set Plans on Demise, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904265504576568563397501724.html.
6. See, e.g., THE PEW FINANCIAL REFORM PROJECT, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS,
STANDARDS FOR RAPID RESOLUTION PLANS 1 (2011), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic Mobility/Sta
ndards RapidResolutionPlans.pdf.
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Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).7 This section requires certain large
financial institutions to regularly report "the plan of such company for
rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material financial distress or
failure."8  These resolution plans became popularly known as "living
wills."9 Many financial institutions and their advocates agreed that
living wills were a prudential measure to avoid the resolution problems
of the 2008 crisis.10 But when the FDIC announced a proposed rule for
the living will requirements on April 22, 2011, observers voiced serious
concerns over the proposed regulations."
With these concerns in mind, the FDIC and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board)
published a final rule with regard to living wills under Dodd-Frank on
November 1, 2011 (Final Rule).12  The Final Rule applies to bank
holding companies with more than $50 billion in assets and nonbank
financial institutions supervised by the Federal Reserve Board,13
collectively known as "Systemically Important Financial Institutions"
(SIFIs).14  Although designations of systemically important nonbank
institutions are currently unknown, at least 124 bank holding companies
are designated as SIFIs.' 5 In conjunction with the Final Rule, the FDIC
announced an interim final rule governing living wills for any FDIC
insured depository institution (IDI) exceeding $50 billion in assets.16
The significance of separate living wills for IDIs is explored in Part
III.17 This Note argues that the Final Rule successfully addresses some
of the key substantive issues raised by the proposed rule by
7. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (Supp. IV 2010).
8. Id.
9. Matt Levine, Soon You'll Be Able to Go to The FDIC Website and See if Uncle
Jamie Left You Anything in His Will, DEALBREAKER (Sept. 13, 2011, 12:55 PM),
http://dealbreaker.com/2011/09/soon-youll-be-able-to-go-to-the-fdic-website-and-see-if-
uncle-jamie-left-you-anything-in-his-will.
10. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323, 67,324 (Nov. 1, 2011)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 381).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 67,323.
13. Id. at 67,335 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243.2(f)).
14. See, e.g., Thecla Fabian, FDIC Approves SIFI, Large Bank Living Will Rules;
Assessment Mod Guidelines, BANKING DAILY (BNA), Sept. 14, 2011.
15. Id
16. Resolution Plans Required for Insured Depository Institutions with $50 Billion or
More in Total Assets, 76 Fed. Reg. 58,379 (Sept. 21, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
360).
17. See infra Part III.
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implementing a flexible approach to living will requirements but
cautions regulators to continue to exercise discretion to ensure the
efficacy of living wills and the minimization of undue regulatory
burden.' 8
The Note will chronicle the development of living wills, identify
some of the key concerns raised after the proposed rule, and analyze the
extent to which the Final Rule addresses these concerns. Also, readers
should gain perspective for developing the resolution planning process
into the future. Part II reviews the background and reasoning behind
requiring living wills for financial institutions, while recognizing the
potential benefits and detriments of these plans at a broad level.19 Part
III highlights key concerns raised after the announcement of the
proposed rule and analyzes the extent to which the flexible approach
implemented in the Final Rule addresses these concerns. 20 Part IV
concludes by identifying some of the unresolved issues surrounding
living wills beyond the scope of this Note's analysis.21
II. THE NEED FOR LIVING WILLS - DODD-FRANK RESPONDS
The 2008 financial crisis and subsequent government bailouts
revealed problems associated with effectively resolving large complex
financial institutions.22 The idea for living wills as a measure to prepare
for effective resolution of financial institutions began to gather support
internationally during 2008.23 The United Kingdom led the way in
adopting the first regulations pertaining to living wills,2 4 and § 165(d) of
Dodd-Frank confirmed that the United States would follow suit. 25
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See Emilios Avgouleas et al., Living Wills as a Catalyst for Action, at 2
(Duisenberg Sch. of Fin. Policy, Paper No. 4, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=l 533808.
23. Adam Feibelman, Living Wills and Pre-Commitment, 1 AM. U. Bus. L. REV. 93, 93
(2011).
24. Nizan Geslevich Packin, The Case Against the Dodd-Frank Act's Living Wills:
Contingency Planning Following the Financial Crisis, BERKELEY Bus. L. J. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 8) ("Most notably, the UK, which led the initiative to adopt such regulations,
and mandates the preparation of Recovery and Resolution Plans."), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/Delivery.cfi/SSRNID1961626_codel607483.pdfabstractid=1
961626&mirid=1.
25. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (Supp. IV 2010).
2012] 135
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
While requiring living wills sounds like a prudent practice, the
effectiveness of the plans is far from certain.26
A. The Problems ofResolving Large Complex Financial
Institutions
The interconnectedness of banks and financial institutions can
be overwhelming for regulators or courts in attempting to unwind these
entities through bankruptcy proceedings or other insolvency regimes.27
Lehman Brothers had over 3,000 legal entities internationally when it
became insolvent. 28 Regulators allowed Lehman Brothers to go into
bankruptcy, creating problems throughout national and international
markets due to the interconnections and credit exposures of such a large
company.29 Conversely, several large financial institutions were bailed
out because government officials determined the failure of such
organizations presented too great of a risk to economic stability.30 The
result in either case was unfavorable: the facilitation of "chaos" in the
market, or the creation of taxpayer burden and moral hazard.31 With an
effective method of planning for such failures and subsequent wind-
downs, these negative consequences could be avoided.32
B. Dodd-Frank Seeks to Facilitate the Resolution Planning
Process
United States regulators first attempted to address resolution
problems even before Congress enacted Dodd-Frank.33 In May 2010,
the FDIC proposed living wills as a requirement for large IDIs, most of
26. See generally Packin, supra note 24 (discussing the shortcomings and possible
negative effects of living wills on financial institutions and markets).
27. See, e.g., Bovenzi, supra note 1.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Richard J. Herring, Wind-down Plans as an Alternative to Bailouts: The
Cross-Border Challenges, in ENDING GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS AS WE KNow THEM 125, 125-
126 (Kenneth E. Scott et. al. eds., 2009).
30. See id. at 125.
31. See id. at 125-26.
32. See Avgouleas, supra note 22, at 2.
33. See Special Reporting, Analysis and Contingent Resolution Plans at Certain Large
Insured Depository Institutions, 75 Fed. Reg. 27,464 (proposed May 17, 2010) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 360).
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which were subsidiaries of bank holding companies.34 Ultimately, the
proposed rule for these IDIs was not finalized in anticipation of future
resolution planning legislation.35 This other legislation came in the
form of § 165(d) of Dodd-Frank, requiring resolution plans for SIFIs.3 6
Section 165(d) provides the framework for living wills. 37  Its
main purpose is to require institutions to form their own plan for "rapid
and orderly resolution in the event of material financial distress or
failure."38 The section requires firms to provide: (1) an assessment of
the protection of depository institutions from the nonbanking entities
and operations of the organization; (2) a description of the
organization's structure and component parts; and (3) an analysis of the
institutions exposure to other parties. 39  The legislation also allows
regulators to expand these informational requirements "by rule or
order." 4 0 Finally, Dodd-Frank requires a "credit exposure report" as a
part of the living will, which includes an analysis of credit extended to
the institution and by the institution.
Through Dodd-Frank, Congress afforded regulators the ability
to impart stiff penalties on institutions that failed to comply with the
requirements set out above.42 Section 165(d) requires the Federal
Reserve Board and the FDIC to notify companies of any deficiencies
with respect to the credibility of their living wills.43 Upon notice of
such deficiency, the company is required to resubmit the plan with
appropriate changes.44 A failure to resubmit a "credible plan" allows
34. Id.
35. See Fabian, supra note 14.
36. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 165(d), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5365(d) (Supp. IV 2010).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 5365(d)(1).
39. Id. § 5365(d)(1)(A).
40. Id. § 5365(d)(1)(D).
41. Id. § 5365(d)(2); see also Client Newsflash, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP,
Counterparty Credit Risk Management: Links Between Supervisory Guidance, Dodd-Frank
and Basel (July 11, 2011), http://www.davispolk.com/publications/ (follow "More
Publications" hyperlink; then follow "Counterparty Credit Risk Management: Links
Between Supervisory Guidance, Dodd-Frank and Basel" hyperlink) [hereinafter
Counterparty Credit Risk] (describing some of the main goals of credit exposure reports
under 165(d) as assessing aggregate risk exposure across an institution and risk exposures of
individual entities or lines of business within the institution).
42. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(5).
43. Id. § 5365(d)(4).
44. Id. § 5365(d)(4)(B).
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regulators to "impose more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity
requirements, or restrictions on the growth, activities, or operations of
the company, or any subsidiary thereof .. ." After imposition of any
of these penalties, a continued failure to resubmit a credible plan within
two years can result in forced divestiture of assets or operations.4 6
Thus, the consequences of noncompliance are potentially very severe.
C. Living Wills as a Way to End "Too-Big-to-Fail"
Many, such as former FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair, touted living
wills as a tool to end the "too-big-to-fail" phenomenon by providing
means to effectively resolve a failed company under bankruptcy
proceedings or other insolvency regimes. At this stage, it is not totally
clear the extent to which living wills would be operational in the actual
event of an institution's failure, but the plans at least serve as a means of
deriving valuable information from institutions.48 Some describe a
successful living will as a sort of "playbook," which would give
regulators options based on the particular conditions surrounding the
failure.49 In whatever manner living wills end up being used, supporters
claim such planning and preparation for resolution will allow
institutions to fail with less harm to the broader market.50
Furthermore, observers recognize living wills as a tool to limit
systemic risk and encourage prudential practices on the part of financial
institutions before failure occurs.' Supporters see living wills as an
evaluation tool for institutions and regulators that could result in the
simplification of an institution's organizational structure or reduced risk
exposure.52 For instance, at least one observer argues that living wills
45. Id. § 5365(d)(5)(A).
46. Id. § 5365(d)(5)(B).
47. See Thecla Fabian, FDIC Proposed Rule Outlines Living Will Needs for
Systemically Significant Finns, BANKING DAILY (BNA), Mar. 30, 2011.
48. Feibelman, supra note 23, at 94.
49. Joe Adler, Regulators Looking for Quality Over Quantity on Living Wills, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 6, 2011 [hereinafter Regulators Looking for Quality], available at 2011
WLNR 25153162.
50. See generally Avgouleas et al., supra note 22 (providing a comprehensive
overview of the potential benefits of living wills before and after the failure of a financial
institution).
51. See id at 3 ("The drawing up of a Living Will could act as a catalyst for thinking
and taking action.").
52. See, e.g., Richard Herring, The Central Role of Resolution Policy in Dealing with
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could work to limit institutional risk exposure - even more so than
regulations designed to directly limit the scope of banking activities. 53
The idea is that effective living wills would force institutions to separate
their risky activities, such as proprietary trading, and simplify their
organizational structures in order to create viable plans for resolution.54
Beyond reorganization, an institution's analysis of sources of funding
and capital adequacy in living wills would prompt them to respond to
these needs earlier on.55  In case institutions fail to respond to
inadequacies on their own, Dodd-Frank provides regulators the power
to take their own actions, including restrictions on operations or
increased capital requirements.56
In addition, at least one scholar underscores the possibility for
living wills to enhance the predictability surrounding an institution's
potential insolvency, since a guide for winding down is established. 7
With this increased predictability, creditors should be able to price
credit extended to institutions more accurately to reflect the risk
associated with the institution's failure. 8 Of course, this predictability
will be most relevant if living wills become actionable plans that are
obtainable by relevant counterparties.59 While it remains to be seen the
extent to which living wills are actionable or accessible by
counterparties, these benefits should certainly be kept in mind.o
Finally, living wills can provide a supplementary tool to some of
the newest powers provided to regulators in Dodd-Frank.6 1 Ideally,
institutions would be in a position to resolve themselves under
Systemically Important Financial Institutions 17-18 (Int'l Ass'n of Deposit Insurers,
Working Paper 2nd Draft, May 29, 2011), http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/1 1/1 1-
71.pdf.
53. See Roshni Banker, Note, Glass-Steagall Through the Back Door: Creating a
Divide in Banking Functions Through the Use of Corporate Living Wills, 2010 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 424, 427-28 (20 10).
54. See id. at 464-67.
55. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (Supp. IV 2010).
56. Id.; see also Avgouleas et al., supra note 22, at 5 (describing the role living wills
can play in providing information to regulators, enabling them to take preemptive action
against failing financial institution).
57. Feibelman, supra note 23, at 108.
58. Id. at 109.
59. See id at 109-11.
60. See generally id. (providing a more complete analysis of these potential benefits).
61. See, e.g., Joe Adler, FDIC Not Waiting for 'Living Wills' to Start Big Bank
Takedown, AM. BANKER, Sept. 26, 2011 [hereinafter FDIC Not Waiting], available at 2011
WLNR 19394285.
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bankruptcy proceedings. 62 But where government officials must step in,
living wills can help avoid a bailout by providing valuable information
for resolving the SIFI under the newly formed "Orderly Liquidation
Authority," created in Dodd-Frank and implemented by the FDIC.63
D. Do the Costs ofLiving Wills Outweigh Their Utility?
While potential benefits of resolution plans exist, negative
consequences for financial institutions are almost inevitable, and poorly
implemented requirements could certainly undermine the value of living
wills. 64 Undoubtedly, institutions will face immense regulatory costs in
preparing and complying with the living will requirements of Dodd-
Frank. 5 The development of credible plans will likely require
substantial outside expertise and counsel, especially for the largest
institutions. 66
Even worse, some observers question the usefulness of such
plans due to the impossibility of foreseeing all potential sources of
stress placed on an institution. 7 More specifically, it is likely that the
62. See, e.g., Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, Resolving Large Complex
Financial Institutions: The Case for Reorganization 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland:
Conf. on Resolving Insolvent Large and Complex Fin. Institutions, Working Paper Draft 11
Apr. 2011, 2011), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/conferences/2011/4-
14-201 1/Bliss kaufman.pdf (noting that historically the preference was to resolve nonbank
financial institutions under bankruptcy proceedings).
63. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5384 (Supp. IV 2010) (providing the statutory
framework for the Orderly Liquidation Authority); Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks by FDIC Acting Chairman Martin J. Gruenberg to the
American Banker Regulatory Symposium; Washington, D.C. (Sept. 19, 2011) (transcript
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spsepl911.html). Part III,
infra, will discuss the implications of living wills on this new authority more in-depth.
64. See, e.g., Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV et al., Resolving Large, Complex Financial
Firms, Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland: Econ. Commentary, Aug. 31, 2011,
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2011/2011-16.cfm ("The challenge
facing policymakers and financial firms is ensuring that the costs of constructing these plans
do not exceed the benefits.").
65. See Eric Dash, Feasting on Paperwork, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2011, at B
(discussing the huge amounts of money lawyers and accountants are making in servicing
recent regulatory requirements, including living wills).
66. See id. (describing Barclays spending in excess of $48 million on staffing and
outside counsel to satisfy the United Kingdom's living will requirements).
67. See, e.g., Nizan Geslevich Packin, The Case Against the Dodd-Frank Act's Living
Wills: Contingency Planning Following the Financial Crisis, BERKELEY Bus. L. J.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 33-34), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfmi/SSRNID1961626_code 1 607483.pdf?abstractid=1
961626&mirid=1 (describing the difficulties in foreseeing worst-case scenarios in living
will preparation).
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next source of economic distress will develop much differently than that
of the most recent financial crisis, making successful planning for such
distress a difficult undertaking.68 If the plans fail to prove useful, living
wills could "become expensive projects with no practical value beyond
compliance for its own sake."69
In addition to the cost-benefit questions of living wills, a plan of
resolution for institutions does not ensure the end of too-big-to-fail or
government bailouts.70 In fact, the landscape of financial institutions is
more consolidated than ever after the mergers of the financial crisis.71
Even after the heightened regulatory environment following the
enactment of Dodd-Frank, the market and rating agencies continue to
indicate that the failure of a financial giant could still prompt
government support.72 Thus, it is unclear that a plan for the resolution
of financial institutions, or other regulatory measures for that matter,
will actually impact the too-big-to-fail phenomenon. 73
E. Proposed Rule Evokes Concern
The FDIC published its proposed rule to implement Dodd-
Frank's resolution planning requirements on April 22, 2011.74 The
proposal was met with uncertainty and concern,75 eliciting twenty-two
comment letters from a broad range of individuals and organizations
within the financial industry. 76 The FDIC categorized these comments
into four main areas including: (1) substantive requirements of plans;
(2) credit exposure reports; (3) the rule's application to foreign-based
68. See Packin, supra note 24, at 45.
69. John L. Douglas et al., Credible Living Wills: The First Generation, DAVIS POLK &
WARDWELL LLP AND McKINSEY & COMPANY 3 (Apr. 25, 2011),
http://www.davispolk.com/publications/ (follow "More Publications" hyperlink; then follow
"Credible Living Wills: The First Generation" hyperlink).
70. See Packin, supra note 24, at 46-49.
71. See id. at 47.
72. See id. at 49.
73. See id.
74. Resolution Plans and Credit Exposure Reports Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 22,648
(proposed Apr. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 381).
75. See generally Thomas P. Vartanian, Set to Go Live with Living Wills, for Better or
Worse, AM. BANKER, Aug. 29, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 16954436 (elaborating on
the concerns surrounding resolution planning).
76. Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323, 67,324 (Nov. 1, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 243).
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institutions; and (4) confidentiality of plan contents. While each of the
other foregoing concerns is important, this Note focuses on concerns
related to substantive requirements, with the assumption that these
substantive aspects have the greatest impact on the effectiveness of
living wills. 78  Specifically, several key substantive issues are
addressed: (1) the timing of initial living will submissions; (2) the
ability of living wills to supplement insolvency regimes other than
bankruptcy; (3) the requirements for smaller and less complex
institutions; (4) the economic scenarios under which resolution planning
is to occur; and (5) the determination of a "credible" living will.
Ultimately, the flexibility adopted in the Final Rule goes a long way in
addressing these issues, but regulators and institutions must continue to
develop the process to lessen regulatory burden and enhance the
efficacy of living wills.
III. ADDRESSING KEY CONCERNS THROUGH A FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO
RULEMAKING
As members of the financial industry waited apprehensively,79
the Federal Reserve Board approved the Final Rule for living wills on
November 1, 2011.80 The Final Rule postponed one of the foremost
81
concerns by delaying the implementation of credit exposure reports.
Credit exposure reports are designed to act as a companion-reporting
requirement to living wills, mapping in detail the credit extended to an
institution and by an institution.82 Regulators felt that credit exposure
reports would be more appropriately addressed in coordination with
other credit exposure requirements to be announced at a later point.83
These credit exposure reports will play a large role in analyzing the
interconnections of an institution and the viability of any plan for its
77. Id.
78. See Douglas et al., supra note 69, at 1 (describing the potential of living wills to be
successful "if designed and implemented properly" but warning that "poorly designed"
plans could be neither "risk mitigating nor efficient").
79. See Vartanian, supra note 75.
80. Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323.
81. Id. at 67,327.
82. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (Supp. IV 2010).
83. Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,327; see also Counterparty Credit
Risk, supra note 41 (describing some of the other legislation directed at monitoring the
credit exposures of financial institutions).
142 [Vol. 16
LIVING WILLS: A FLEXIBLE FINAL RULE
resolution.84 As for the other requirements, the Final Rule exhibited a
change from the proposed rule, and while it did not eliminate all
concern, the rule significantly eased some key concerns of financial
institutions.
A. Initial Living Will Submissions - More Time for Smaller
Institutions
One substantive issue within the proposed rule that troubled
many was the time period during which initial plans would be due for
submission.86 The proposed rule required covered institutions to submit
their resolution plans within 180 days of the Final Rule's effective
date. Commenters believed the short time frame would prove
inadequate, and some observers recommended that regulators extend the
deadline for initial living will submissions up to eighteen months after
rule enactment.88 Others took a different approach, suggesting a "pilot
program" with only the largest and most complex institutions.89
The FDIC responded to these suggestions by implementing a
"staggered" approach.90  Instead of one deadline applicable to all
institutions, the Final Rule requires an initial submission of living wills
based on the size of financial institutions. 91 The largest institutions -
holding over $250 billion in nonbank assets - must submit initial plans
by July 1, 2012; institutions with over $100 billion in nonbank assets
84. See Resolution Plans and Credit Exposure Reports Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 22,648,
22,649 (proposed April 22, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 381) ("The credit exposure
reports required by the statute will also provide important information critical to ongoing
risk management and advance planning processes by identifying the company's significant
credit exposures and other key information across the entity and its related entities.").
85. See Donna Borak, Regulators Offer Flexibility on Living Will Requirement, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 14, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 18149979.
86. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,324 ("Commenters suggested
that submissions of the resolution plan be phased in to allow firms sufficient time to prepare
and collect the extensive information required as part of the plan.").
87. Resolution Plans and Credit Exposure Reports Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 22,650.
88. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,324 ("Commenters argued that
the requirement to submit initial plans 180 days from the effective date of the final rule is
too short.").
89. The Sec. Industry and Fin. Markets Ass'n et al., Comments on the Joint Notice of
Prosed Rulemaking by the Federal Reserve and FDIC Regarding Resolution Plans and
Credit Exposure Reports, THE CLEARING HOUSE 11 (Jun. 10, 2011),
http://www.theclearinghouse.org/index.html?f=072314.
90. Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,324.
91. See id at 67,335-36 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243.3).
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must submit initial plans by July 1, 2013; and those covered institutions
with less than $100 billion in nonbank assets must submit plans by
December 31, 2013.92
The staggered submission of living wills can facilitate an
ongoing discourse between institutions and regulators.9 3 For regulators,
the feasibility of reviewing the initial submissions of numerous covered
institutions for compliance was "unrealistic," commented one industry
expert. 94 Implementing the submissions in stages will afford regulators
the chance to develop the process and learn the things to look for.95 For
institutions in the second or third stage of submission, the approach will
provide greater preparation time and knowledge of expectations, since
the "iterative process" has already begun.96 For instance, certain parts
of the first-stage institutions' plans will be necessarily made public
pursuant to the Final Rule. 97  Second and third stage institutions will
likely be able to leverage this information to their advantage in
determining the credibility of their own living wills. Thus, the
staggered submission of initial plans will potentially lessen the burden
and improve the process for institutions and regulators, especially in the
second and third stages.
Even with this more flexible approach, the obvious question
remains: what about the large institutions who must submit their plans
first?98  These institutions will face the most uncertainty and the
possibility of shifting standards.99 However, the approach is partially
justified based on the large size of these institutions, making them more
equipped to withstand regulatory costs that could result from initial
inefficiencies.100  Furthermore, these institutions pose the most
92. Id
93. Id.
94. Borak, supra note 85 (quoting Randy Guynn, partner and head of the financial
institutions group at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP).
95. See id.
96. See id. ("So, we are in some ways in uncharted territory, an iterative process to
develop and maintain credible plans.").
97. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,340 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 243.8(c)).
98. See Borak, supra note 85 ("The difficulty is banks first in line may wonder whether
the requirements and the standards the agencies will use would change over time.").
99. See id.
100. See generally Nicole V. Crain & W. Mark Crain, The Impact of Regulatory Costs
on Small Firms, U.S. SMALL BusINESS ADMIN. (Sept. 2010),
http://www.sba.gov/advocacy/853/2016 (describing the disproportionate impact of
regulatory costs on smaller businesses).
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immediate risk to the economic stability of the United States due to
their size and interconnections.'o Accordingly, they should garner the
most immediate attention in terms of planning for their failure.' 02
While placing large institutions first in line is partially justified
based on their size, regulators should still ensure that first stage
institutions are not unfairly burdened. The FDIC recognized this burden
and stressed that "the process of submission and review of the initial
resolution plan iterations is to include an ongoing dialogue with
firms." 03  Regulators have the authority to facilitate this "ongoing
dialogue" through tools provided in the Final Rule. 104 For instance, one
section of the Final Rule allows regulators to extend time periods for
institutions to cure defects in initial submissions. 105 Also, the
determination of a deficient plan appears to be largely discretionary in a
plain reading of the language. 106
In fact, regulators should exercise greater tolerance and lenience
in reviewing all institutions' first submissions - after all, initial
submissions are but one part of a much larger ongoing process.10 7 After
these first living wills are formed, institutions must still update them
annually, taking into account any "material events" that might affect
previous submissions.'0o If a material event is deemed important
enough, regulators may require an "interim update."1 09 In addition,
regulators are granted the discretion to require resolution updates more
101. See generally Nassim N. Taleb & Charles S. Tapiero, Too Big to Fail, Hidden
Risks, and the Fallacy of Large Institutions (Ctr. for Risk Eng'g, N.Y.U Polytechnic Inst.,
Working Paper, May 2, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1398102 (analyzing the risks to the
broader financial markets associated with extremely large financial institutions).
102. See id at 1 (arguing the risks associated with large financial institutions outweigh
the benefits from their economies of scale).
103. Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323, 67,328 (Nov. 1, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 243).
104. See id at 67,339 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243.5).
105. Id. ("Upon their own initiative or a written request by a covered company, the
Board and Corporation may jointly extend any time period under this section.").
106. Id. (describing the determination of deficiency based on a finding that the plan "is
not credible or would not facilitate an orderly resolution," but failing to provide any specific
guidelines).
107. See id at 67,328; Regulators Looking for Quality, supra note 49 (detailing early
developments in the resolution planning process and highlighting the numerous
uncertainties that remain).
108. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,335-36 (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 243.3(b)(2)).
109. See id. at 67,335 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243.3(b)(1)).
2012] 145
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
frequently or to extend the time period for an institution's next
submission.110 Thus, institutions and regulators will have numerous
opportunities to make these plans useful and efficient."' And while a
good faith effort on the part of the institution is certainly important,
regulators should keep in mind that initial submissions are only the first
iteration of many." 2
B. Can Living Wills Supplement Insolvency Regimes Other than
Bankruptcy?
The proposed rule for living wills raised concerns regarding the
extent to which institutions must take into account other applicable
insolvency regimes in their analysis." 3  A single institution might be
subject to a multitude of insolvency regimes as a result of the diverse
entities it holds.' 14 Obviously, bank holding companies would be
subject to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), which would
place the insolvent bank in receivership with the FDIC."5  But other
entities might be subject to other regimes, such as state or
internationally enacted insolvency guidelines.1 6  Commenters
recognized the potential burdens of creating a resolution strategy for
entities subject to these insolvency regimes outside of the Bankruptcy
Code." 7  Consideration of these other regimes could significantly
increase both the complexity and cost of creating an effective living
will."s
110. Id. at 67,336 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243.3(c)).
111. See id. at 67,335-36 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243.3) (signifying the possibility
of multiple iterations of living wills, even within the same year).
112. See id. at 67,328 (describing the formation of living wills as a process that will
require multiple iterations).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 67,328 (providing examples of other potential insolvency regimes).
115. See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 595-596 (4th ed. 2010).
116. Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,328.
117. See id. at 67,328.
118. See, e.g., Client Alert, Joseph T. Lynyak, III, Pillsbury Winthorp Shaw Pittman
LLP, "Living Wills" for Bank Holding Companies, Depository Institutions and Foreign
Banking Organizations 4 (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://www.pillsburylaw.com/index.cfn?pageid=34&itemid=40334 (identifying the
expertise institutions will need in bankruptcy and FDIC receivership law in preparing
credible living wills).
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1. Limiting the Consideration of Other Insolvency Regimes
The Final Rule first addresses these concerns by limiting the
extent to which institutions must account for other applicable
insolvency regimes.119 Under the requirements of the Final Rule,
institutions may exclude from their "strategic analysis"l 20 any entity
subject to a regime other than the Bankruptcy Code to the extent such
entity has less than $50 billion in assets and does not conduct "critical
operations. Thus, institutions can at least avoid analysis involving
other insolvency regimes for insubstantial parts of the company. 122
This concession on the part of regulators is a prudent measure
towards minimizing undue regulatory burden. Certainly, the task of
preparing credible living wills in line with bankruptcy proceedings will
be an expensive undertaking in itself.123 To add a multitude of other
insolvency regimes into the mix would entail even more expertise and
complication.124  For example, under the proposed rule, a financial
institution might need to analyze its insurance subsidiaries under all
relevant state insolvency laws, since insurance is an industry generally
regulated at the state level.125 The Final Rule eliminates this possibility
if the entity is not of substantial size or importance.126 This is at least a
119. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,337 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 243.4(c)(1)(v)).
120. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243.4(c)) ("Each resolution plan shall include a
strategic analysis describing the covered company's plan for rapid and orderly resolution in
the event of material financial distress or failure of the covered company.").
121. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243.4(c)(1)(v)); id at 67,335 (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 243.2(g)) ("Critical operations means those operations of the covered company,
including associated services, functions and support, the failure or discontinuance of which,
in the view of the covered company or as jointly directed by the Board and the Corporation,
would pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.").
122. See id. at 67,337 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243.4(c)(1)(v)) (eliminating
consideration of insolvency regimes other than the Bankruptcy Code so long as the entity
does not have $50 billion in assets or conduct a critical operation).
123. See Dash, supra note 65 (indicating the large financial burden associated with
preparing living wills).
124. See, e.g., Lynyak, supra note 118, at 4 (describing the specialized expertise in
common insolvency regimes required to meet living will requirements).
125. See Frank A. Mayer III & Michael J. Callaghan, Counterparty Risk and Orderly
Liquidation Authority Under the Dodd-Frank Act, THOMSON REUTERS ACCELUS (Mar. 21,
2011), http://www.complinet.com/dodd-frank/news/analysis/article/counterparty-risk-and-
orderly-liquidation-authority-under-the-dodd-frank-act.html (describing the problems
encountered by business counterparties in identifying applicable state insolvency regimes).
126. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,336 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 243.4(c)(1)(v)).
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small step on the part of regulators in avoiding unneeded regulatory
burden.
2. Special Treatment for Resolution of Insured Depository Institutions
On the other hand, regulators did pay special attention to the
insolvency regime established for IDIs under the FDIA. 127 As noted in
Part I, the FDIC released the Final Rule, as required by Dodd-Frank, for
the resolution plans of SIFIs (SIFI Plan) in conjunction with an interim
final rule for the resolution plan of IDIs (IDI Plan).12' The IDI Plan
rules were finalized on January 23, 2012 and are applicable to IDIs with
greater than $50 billion in assets.129 The two plans resemble each other
in many ways, but differ with regard to some objectives.13 0 Of course,
the Final Rule for SIFI Plans applies to financial institutions, including
bank holding companies and nonbank financial institutions, whereas the
final rule for IDI Plans applies solely to depository institutions.13 ' Thus,
a bank holding company could be subject to two living will
requirements - one for the institution as a whole and one for the
subsidiary depository institution.13 2
The IDI Plan focuses directly on the insolvency regime
applicable to depository institutions, pursuant to the FDIA.133 Under the
FDIA, the FDIC generally acts as a receiver to failed IDIs, with the
goals of insuring depositors' interests and the viability of the FDIC's
127. See generally Resolution Plans Required for Insured Depository Institutions With
$50 Billion or More in Total Assets, 77 Fed. Reg. 3075 (Jan. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 360) (providing special rules for resolution plans of insured depository
institutions).
128. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Adopts Final Rule on Resolution
Plans Under Dodd-Frank (Sept. 13, 2011),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/prl 1151 .html.
129. See Resolution Plans Required for Insured Depository Institutions With $50 Billion
or More in Total Assets, 77 Fed. Reg. at 3075.
130. See Client Alert, Dwight C. Smith et al., Morrison & Foerester LLP, Living Wills:
FDIC Approves Final Rules 2 (Sept. 16, 2011),
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110916-Living-Wills-Final-Rules.pdf.
131. Compare Resolution Plans Required for Insured Depository Institutions With $50
Billion or More in Total Assets, 77 Fed. Reg. at 3084 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §
360.10(a)) (applying solely to FDIC insured depository institutions), with Resolution Plans
Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,323 (applying to "nonbank financial compan[ies]" and "bank
holding compan[ies]").
132. At the time of the release of the Final Rule, thirty-four companies were subject to
both rules. See Smith et al., supra note 130, at 2.
133. See id
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insurance fund under the "least-cost" method.134 Since these goals are
different from those of bankruptcy law, the strategic analysis for
resolution differs accordingly. In sum, the IDI Plan directs institutions
to provide their strategic analysis with the specific goals of assisting the
FDIC in its receivership duties and protecting the interests of
depositors. 135
The requirement of separate IDI Plans is likely a sensible
measure. Protecting the FDIC insurance fund is certainly one of the
necessities in ensuring the viability of the banking industry and
economic stability. 136 Considering the FDIC fund's recent issues - with
fund reserves falling below zero in 2009137 - IDI Plans seem like an
extra requirement worth the added cost. In addition, the added
regulatory costs should prove minimal. In the final rule for IDI Plans,
the FDIC acknowledges that the two plans will substantially overlap
and provide similar informational requirements.' 38  Thus, these IDI
Plans can provide extra protection to the FDIC's funding, while not
substantially adding to the informational burden of living will
139
requirements.
134. See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, supra note 115, at 595-96.
135. See Resolution Plans Required for Insured Depository Institutions With $50 Billion
or More in Total Assets, 77 Fed. Reg. at 3085 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 360.10(a))
("This rule is intended to ensure that the FDIC has access to all of the material information
it needs to resolve efficiently a covered insured depository institution in the event of its
failure.").
136. See id at 3075 ("In implementing the deposit insurance program and in efficiently
and effectively resolving failed depository institutions, the FDIC strengthens the stability of,
and helps maintain public confidence in, the banking system in the United States.").
137. See, e.g., Karey Wutkowski, FDIC Fund Falls into Red, Bair Urges Lending,
REUTERS (Nov. 24, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/24/us-banks-fdic-
idUSTRE5AN36P20091124.
138. See Resolution Plans Required for Insured Depository Institutions With $50 Billion
or More in Total Assets, 77 Fed. Reg. at 3085 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §
360.10(c)(1)(iv)) (providing for the incorporation of data from the SIFI Plan into the IDI
Plan); id. at 3076 ("The Rule is intended to complement the resolution plan requirements of
the Dodd-Frank Act.").
139. See, e.g., Client Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Credible Living
Wills Under the U.S. Regulatory Framework 9 (Sept. 19, 2011),
http://www.davispolk.com/publications/list.aspx (follow "Credible Living Wills Under the
U.S. Regulatory Framework" hyperlink) (indicating a belief that institutions may be able to
simply submit one integrated resolution plan to satisfy IDI and SIFI requirements).
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3. Preparing for Resolution under the Orderly Liquidation Authority
Surprisingly, the newly formed insolvency regime in Dodd
Frank - the Title II "Orderly Liquidation Authority" - received little
attention in the proposed rule or the Final Rule. 14 0  Under this new
authority, the FDIC may act as a receiver for large bank holding
companies and other non-bank SIFIs.141 Essentially, it gives the FDIC
the power to resolve these financial institutions under its own power, if
it determines bankruptcy proceedings or other insolvency measures are
inadequate.142  After the announcement of the proposed rule for
resolution plans, observers questioned the practical value that living
wills would have in the exercise of this Orderly Liquidation
Authority.14 3  Yet the Final Rule fails to require any analysis by
institutions with regard to the Orderly Liquidation Authority.14 4
Instead, the Final Rule recognizes Dodd-Frank's resolution
plans as a supplement to regulatory authorities in planning for the
exercise of this Orderly Liquidation Authority.145 In particular, the
FDIC has asserted that IDI Plans and SIFI Plans are only two of the
three plans to be created - the third will be a plan created by regulators
for resolution of institutions under the Orderly Liquidation Authority. 4 6
In creating this plan, regulators will leverage information from the
140. 12 U.S.C. § 5384 (Supp. IV 2010) (codifying the Orderly Liquidation Authority).
141. See id § 5384(b).
142. See, e.g., Mark A. McDermott, Analysis of the Orderly Liquidation Authority, Title
II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, SKADDEN, ARPS,
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP 1 (2010),
http://www.skadden.com/newsletters/FSR_ AAnalysisOrderlyLiquidationAuthority.pdf
(suggesting the purpose of the Orderly Liquidation Authority as improving financial
stability and ending bailouts by providing an insolvency regime with the FDIC acting as
receiver).
143. See, e.g., The Sec. Industry and Fin. Markets Ass'n et al., supra note 89, at 8
(describing the necessity for other resolution planning tools since SIFI Plans are statutorily
unable to address other insolvency regimes, including those under Title II).
144. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323 (Nov. 1, 2011) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 243) (making no mention of the Orderly Liquidation Authority).
145. See id at 67,323 ("The resolution plan required of covered companies under this
final rule will support the Corporation's planning for the exercise of its resolution authority
under the Dodd-Frank Act and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act ('FDI Act') by providing
the Corporation with an understanding of the covered companies' structure and complexity
as well as their resolution strategies and processes.").
146. See, e.g., FDIC Not Waiting, supra note 61 (describing regulators forming their
own resolution plans for financial institutions).
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institution's own living will.147 Therefore, it appears planning for the
exercise of the Orderly Liquidation Authority will be a task for
regulators, rather than institutions.148
Eliminating the consideration of the Orderly Liquidation
Authority on the part of institutions is necessary at this stage. Some
analysts argue the Bankruptcy Code is inadequate to facilitate the
resolution of large financial institutions, and therefore, living wills
should reflect resolution under an authority that is more aptly designed
for this purpose.149 While this may be the case, the Orderly Liquidation
Authority is currently too underdeveloped to put the burden on
institutions to plan for its use.15 0  To require institutions to speculate
into the logistics of this authority would likely prove unfruitful and
burdensome, as the effectiveness of the Orderly Liquidation Authority
has yet to be proven.' 5  Instead, institutions should focus their living
wills on other insolvency regimes, as the Orderly Liquidation Authority
is an insolvency method of "last resort." 52  Furthermore, there is
nothing in the Final Rule to preclude analysis of the Orderly Liquidation
Authority in the future. 5 3  Thus, it seems appropriate to allow
regulators, rather than institutions, to plan for the new Orderly
Liquidation Authority.
Nonetheless, regulators must exercise caution in relying on
information in institution-formed living wills in their planning for use of
the Orderly Liquidation Authority. Inaccurate or faulty living wills
could undermine the planning process. Critics of living wills point out
that the supervisors of institutions do not necessarily have the greater
147. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,323 (recognizing institution-
formed resolution plans as a supplement to regulators' own planning).
148. See FDIC Not Waiting, supra note 61.
149. See generally George G. Kaufman, Living Wills: Putting the Caboose Before the
Engine and Designing a Better Engine, LOY. U. OF CHI. L.J. (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1599787 (describing the necessity of
forming a more workable insolvency regime upon which to base living wills).
150. See Diane Davis, Bankruptcy: Bankruptcy Code's Effectiveness in Resolving
Failed Complex Financial Institutions Unclear, BANKING DAILY (BNA), Jul. 21, 2011
(describing an analysis that proved inconclusive in comparing the effectiveness of
bankruptcy with other regimes such as the Orderly Liquidation Authority).
151. See id.
152. See Jamieson L. Hardee, Note, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act: The Orderly Liquidation Authority: The Creditor's Perspective, 15 N.C.
BANKING INST. 259, 275 (2011).
153. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323.
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interest of the public in mind,15 4 and this could lead to inaccurate
reporting for the sake of compliance. In addition, the discretion that
lends to the flexibility of the Final Rule presents more possibilities for
inaccuracy.155 For instance, the institution's assessment of the resources
it will have available in times of financial distress will require a level of
appraisal that cannot be exact.156 Regulators address these concerns by
providing oversight and requiring institutions to provide a "detailed
description" of how such conclusions were reached. 57  Even with this
oversight, the assessment of living will credibility will likely be a
process on its own. And the importance of this process is underscored
by the negative impact that inaccurate living wills could have on the
regulators' own plans for orderly liquidation. 5 8
C. Can the Flexibility in the Final Rule Provide Relief to Less
Complex Institutions?
Another issue raised by commenters after the FDIC released the
proposed rule was the fact that living wills had the same minimum
requirements, irrespective of the size or complexity of the particular
institution.159 Commenters argued that simply organized institutions
were subject to the same requirements as large and complex institutions
solely because they held more than $50 billion in assets.160
In a change from the proposed rule, the Final Rule implements
less comprehensive content requirements for institutions with nonbank
154. See Ron J. Feldman, Forcing Financial Institution Change Through Credible
Recovery/Resolution Plans: An Alternative to Plan-Now/Implement-Later Living Wills, THE
FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS 3 (May 6, 2010),
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pubdisplay.cfm?id=4434.
155. See, e.g., Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,337 (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 243.4(c)(1)(iii)) (allowing institutions to assess their own "needs" in the event of
"financial distress" - an inquiry that appears highly discretionary).
156. See id.
157. Id. at 67,337 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243.4(c)(1)).
158. See id at 67,323 (recognizing that institutions' plans will be relied upon in the
regulators' own planning).
159. See Joe Adler, Relief from Living Will Rules Sought By Midsize Firms, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 9, 2011 [hereinafter Relieffrom Living Will Rules], available at 2011 WLNR
17828061 (describing the concern less complex firms expressed in being subject to the same
rules as those much larger and more complex).
160. See id ("'You could have a relatively plain-vanilla, less complex operation but be
$50 billion and you're under these requirements,' said Lawrence Kaplan, an attorney at
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP.").
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assets of less than $100 billion and insured depository assets that make
up greater than eight-five percent of the institution's total assets.161 This
"tailored plan" is a designed concession on the part of regulators to
lessen the informational burden for these institutions since their smaller
size and less complex structure do not warrant such strenuous
requirements.162 Most notably, the tailored plan requires information
regarding only the nonbanking aspects of the institution in four of the
"strategic analysis" categories.163 This change was likely a welcome
surprise to "midsize firms" that felt their structures did not necessitate
the same living will requirements as large complex institutions. 164
Upon further inspection, it seems the tailored plan's benefit to
less complex institutions is largely illusory.165 The alleged benefit of
the tailored plan is the allowance for these institutions to analyze only
their nonbanking operations in their living willS.166 But keep in mind,
most of these same institutions eligible for the tailored plan are also
subject to IDI Plan requirements, which focus solely on depository
institutions' banking operations.167 Hence, the same institutions
exempted from providing information on banking operations under their
SIFI Plan would still have to analyze banking activities under their IDI
plan.'6 8  It's unclear how these tailored plans provide any substantial
regulatory relief for less complex firms. Perhaps, these institutions
should be totally exempt from SIFI Plan requirements, considering their
nonbanking assets comprise at most fifteen percent of the institution.169
If nonbanking operations did pose a risk to the resolution of the
161. Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,336 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §
243.4(a)(3)).
162. See Borak, supra note 85.
163. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,336 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 243.4(a)(3)).
164. See Relieffrom Living Will Rules, supra note 159.
165. See Dwight C. Smith et al., supra note 130, at 6 ("The IDIs of these Covered
Companies will still be required to file IDI Plans, which will likely involve the same level of
detail and information as the DFA Plan otherwise demands for Covered Companies of
similar size and complexity in the discussion of banking operations.").
166. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,336 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 243.4(a)(3)).
167. See Dwight C. Smith et al., supra note 130, at 6.
168. See id.
169. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,336 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 243.4(a)(3)) (requiring the "total insured depository institution assets" to make up "85
percent or more of the covered company's total consolidated assets" in order to be eligible
for the tailored plan).
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institution, these problems would presumably be discovered in the IDI's
strategy to unwind from the holding company.170
While the tailored plan's advantages are unclear, regulators can
still work to lessen the burden for less complex bank holding companies
through the discretion provided in the final rule for IDI Plans."' The
final rule for IDI Plans explicitly states "[t]he resolution strategy should
be tailored to the size, complexity and risk profile of the institution." 72
Presumably, regulators should review the strategy of depository
institutions with a level of assessment proportional to the banks' risk to
the economy and the FDIC Insurance Fund.173  Obviously, smaller
institutions pose less of a risk and should accordingly require less
onerous detail and analysis in their living wills.174  Hopefully, such
measures will be exercised by regulators to minimize undue regulatory
burden while still providing the benefits of living wills.
D. Final Rule Provides Guidance for Economic Scenarios to be
Considered in Living Wills
A primary concern of some commenters to the proposed rule
involved the practicality of considering the numerous possible
economic conditions under which failure might occur.175 The proposed
rule provided little guidance on the type of external conditions to be
considered in a credible plan.17 6 The Final Rule responded by allowing
170. IDIs must "[plrovide a strategy to unwind or separate the CIDI and its subsidiaries
from the organizational structure of its parent company in a cost-effective and timely
fashion." See Resolution Plans Required for Insured Depository Institutions With $50
Billion or More in Total Assets, 77 Fed. Reg. 3075, 3085 (Jan. 23, 2012) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 360).
171. See Dwight C. Smith et al., supra note 130, at 6 ("In practice, greater regulatory
relief should be available regardless of whether a Covered Company is filing a standard or
tailored DFA Plan.").
172. Resolution Plans Required for Insured Depository Institutions With $50 Billion or
More in Total Assets, 77 Fed. Reg. at 3081.
173. See Relief from Living Will Rules, supra note 159 (suggesting that plans should
vary depending on the size and complexity of institutions).
174. See id
175. See, e.g., Thomas P. Vartanian, et. al., Living Will Requirements Come into Focus,
DECHERT LLP 2 (Sept. 15 2011), http://www.dechert.com/publications/ (follow "Featured
Publications" hyperlink; then follow "Living Will Requirements Come into Focus"
hyperlink).
176. See Resolution Plans and Credit Exposure Reports Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 22,648
(Apr. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252) (providing little guidance throughout
the document on what economic scenarios are to be considered in resolution planning).
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firms to assume that failure will occur under certain economic scenarios
provided pursuant to § 165(i) of Dodd-Frank's stress testing
requirements. 177
Stress tests under Dodd-Frank include a "baseline scenario," an
"adverse" scenario, and "a severely adverse" scenario that regulators
will use to assess a bank's position and stability under varying negative
external conditions.178 These same economic scenarios will provide the
backdrop under which resolution planning is to occur.'79 For the initial
submission of living wills, institutions are permitted to assume failure
will occur only under the baseline scenario.1so In subsequent
submissions, the FDIC will expand the scenarios to be considered to
include the "adverse and severely adverse economic conditions."' 81
The Final Rule's use of these stress test scenarios in living wills
should provide a more workable and useful model. 182 With no guidance
on what scenarios to consider in the proposed rule,183 institutions were
placed in a situation where they must foresee economic uncertainty.
Under the Final Rule, the role is placed more squarely in the hands of
regulators to evaluate possible economic circumstances.' 84
While the use of stress test scenarios is likely beneficial, the
value of these economic scenarios is largely dependent on the ability of
regulators to predict and anticipate economic trouble and market
177. Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323, 67,328 (Nov. 1, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 243).
178. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (Supp. IV 2010); Craig Torres, Stress-Test Guidelines for
Smaller Banks Issued by U.S. Under Dodd-Frank, BLOOMBERG (June 9, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-09/stress-test-guidelines-for-smaller-banks-
issued-by-u-s-under-dodd-frank.html.
179. Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,328 ("Take into account that such
material financial distress or failure of the covered company may occur under the baseline,
adverse and severely adverse economic conditions provided to the covered company by the
Board pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 5365(i)(1)(B) ..... ).
180. Id. at 67,336-37 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243.4(a)(4)(i)).
18 1. Id.
182. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,328 (describing the use of these
economic scenarios as a way to "assist" institutions in their planning).
183. See Resolution Plans and Credit Exposure Reports Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 22,648
(Apr. 22, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252) (leaving it up to institutions to
determine economic scenarios to be accounted for).
184. See generally Jeffrey Sparshott, U.S. Regulators Outline Banking Stress-Test Rules,
WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304778304576375611864269874.html
(describing the early development of stress testing rules).
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conditions.185  While stress test rules are not yet finalized,186 observers
have provided recommendations on future stress testing rules, and many
of these recommendations may enhance the efficacy of living wills. 87
A primary goal among observers is that these stress tests provide
"plausible" scenarios. 188 Commenters observe that "the more extreme
and unrealistic a scenario is, the less useful it is as a management
tool." 89 In contrast, some observers question the utility of past stress
testing attempts due to scenarios that are not sufficiently adverse. 190 In
either case, an implausible or unrealistic scenario would undermine the
value of living wills by making the scenarios institutions must consider
burdensome or potentially ineffectual. Thus, as regulators seek to
finalize rules with regard to stress testing, 191 they should keep in mind
the implications that such rulemaking could have on the viability of
living wills.
E. What is a Credible Plan?
The proposed rule left many financial industry members
wondering exactly what a credible living will looks like. 192 For
institutions, their uneasiness was justified given the potential for stiff
185. See, e.g., The Financial Services Roundtable et. al., Re: Proposed Guidance on
Stress Testing, THE CLEARING HOUSE 3 (Jul. 29, 2011),
www.theclearinghouse.org/index.html?f=072616 (indicating that the scenarios considered in
stress tests are foremost concerns in developing effective and efficient stress testing).
186. See Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for
Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594 (Jan. 5, 2012) (announcing proposed standards for
stress testing rules).
187. See, e.g., The Financial Services Roundtable et. al., supra note 185 (providing
comment on proposed guidelines for stress testing rules).
188. See id. at 4.
189. See id at 3.
190. See Nouriel Roubini, Stress Testing the Stress Test Scenarios: Actual Macro Data
Are Already Worse than the More Adverse Scenario for 2009 in the Stress Tests. So the
Stress Tests Fail the Basic Criterion of Reality Check Even Before They Are Concluded,
ECONOMONITOR (Apr. 13, 2009), http://www.economonitor.com/nourie/2009/04/13/stress-
testing-the-stress-test-scenarios-actual-macro-data-are-already-worse-than-the-more-
adverse-scenario-for-2009-in-the-stress-tests-so-the-stress-tests-fail-the-basic-criterion-of-
reality-check-e/ ("Thus, the stress test results are meaningless as actual data are already
running worse than the worst case scenario.").
191. See Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for
Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594 (announcing proposed standards for stress testing
rules).
192. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,323, 67,325 (Nov. 1, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 243).
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penalties upon failure to submit a credible living will. 193 The Final Rule
did little to ease these concerns, leaving most of the specifics of living
wills undetermined.194  Some in the industry recognized that detailed
compliance with the Final Rule's requirements could require thousands
of pages of reporting, prompting questions as to the usefulness of
preparing or reviewing such an onerous document.195
As the process for developing living wills begins, initial reports
indicate that regulators are working to ease the burden of the lack of
specificity in the Final Rule.196  Among other things, regulators
emphasize the organic nature of the process, recognizing initial
submissions will not be perfect.197 There is some indication as to the
components of the plans that require the most attention, and law firms
have wasted little time developing comprehensive guides to creating
effective resolution plans.198 Reports further indicate the likelihood that
the most serious penalties will not be levied against institutions on
initial submissions.199 Thus, the concern over the lack of clarity in the
Final Rule is at least temporarily eased.200
Nonetheless, the process needs to develop to the point where
institutions and regulators know what to expect. Doing so will allow
living wills to become a preventive measure, rather than simply a guide
for failure. 201 If institutions understand the requirements of a credible
living will and the potential penalties, they will be prompted to engage
in self-regulation, preventing them from becoming too big or too
complex.202 For instance, if an institution found it too costly or unviable
193. See id. at 67,339 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243.6) (providing for penalties such
as increased capital requirements or even divestiture in extreme cases).
194. See, e.g., Regulators Looking for Quality, supra note 49 (noting various
uncertainties that remain with regard to living will submissions).
195. See id.
196. See id. (indicating that regulators are looking more to the quality of living wills,
with specific emphasis on certain component parts).
197. See id.
198. See, e.g., Dwight Smith et al., Living Wills: The Final Rule, A User Guide,
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP (Nov. 2011),
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/1 10905-Living-Wills.pdf (providing a
comprehensive guide to the development of a credible living will).
199. Regulators Looking for Quality, supra note 49.
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Banker, supra note 53, at 428 (suggesting that living wills could provide
a means to making financial institutions safer and less complex).
202. See id. at 464-65 (suggesting that living wills would require institutions to "fence
off' risky parts of their business in order to comply with planning requirements).
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to create a plan for resolution under its current structure, the institution
would have the incentive to downsize or reorganize itself to the point
where such resolution is possible.203 A failure to do so would allow
regulators to impart their own penalties on institutions not meeting these
expectations.20 But much work is needed to develop the process to the
point where living wills can provide such results.205 As regulators
continue the discourse with institutions, the development of a
framework for credible living wills should be a primary goal.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion highlights several of the key issues
and concerns raised by living will requirements. Nonetheless, there are
a number of other issues - beyond the scope of this Note - that remain
unresolved.
Namely, questions remain regarding the confidentiality of living
wills, as institutions' plans will undoubtedly contain sensitive
information.206 The Final Rule provides that plans will contain a
"public section and a confidential section." 207 The rule lays out some
information that will necessarily be public such as the executive
summary.208 Beyond these required public sections, the Final Rule
declares that the confidentiality of certain sections will be determined
under applicable laws.209 Companies may petition for confidential
treatment of information, but it remains to be seen how these laws
affecting disclosure - such as exemptions in the Freedom of
Information Act - will interplay with living will submissions. 2 10 The
intermingling of these informational disclosure laws with resolution
planning will certainly be an area of interest for financial institutions
moving forward.
203. See id.
204. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,339 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 243.6) (describing the possible penalties).
205. See generally Regulators Looking for Quality, supra note 49 (signifying that much
uncertainty exists in regulators expectations for living wills).
206. See, e.g., Lynyak, supra note 118, at 4 (noting that resolution plans will likely
contain "highly proprietary" information regarding the subject institutions).
207. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,340 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 243.8(c)).
208. Id.
209. See id (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243.8(d)(1)).
210. See, e.g., Lynyak, supra note 118, at 4.
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In addition, issues remain regarding the effect of living will
requirements on foreign-based institutions.21 1 Currently, the Final Rule
does provide some concession to these foreign-based institutions.212
They are only required to submit information pertaining to their entities
and operations "that are domiciled in the United States or conducted in
whole or material part in the United States."213 The foreign institution
must describe how resolution planning for these domestic operations is
a part of the institution's resolution planning as a whole.214 This
concession still places a considerable burden on these companies,
especially with similar resolution planning requirements in other
215countries. Thus, it seems a consolidated international approach
would be beneficial to all firms, but the coordination of these efforts
does not yet exist.216
Issues of confidentiality and the impact on foreign-based
institutions are only two of the various issues unaddressed in this
Note.217 Hopefully, the analysis provided in Part III will work as a
starting point for considering the implications of the flexibility in the
Final Rule on these and other issues. Regulators must strive to reach
211. See Kate Davidson, Foreign Banks Grow Uneasy Over Dodd-Frank - Those With
Small U.S. Operations Fear High Compliance Cost, AM. BANKER, May 24, 2011, available
at 2011 WLNR 10275897 (describing the fears that foreign banks have expressed regarding
the high compliance costs associated with a presence in the United States).
212. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,336 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 243.4(a)(2)) (providing special treatment to "[fjoreign-based covered companies").
213. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243.4(a)(2)(i)).
214. See id (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243.4(a)(2)(ii)).
215. See Andrew Hickley, UK Urged to Slow Resolution Plans, GFS NEWS (Nov. 10,
2011), http://www.gfsnews.com/article/3549/1/ (describing calls to slow living will
requirements in the United Kingdom, in order to align the plans with international
initiatives).
216. See Sylvia Mayer et. al., FSB Issues Recommendations on Global Resolution
Planning, BANKRUPTCY BLOG (July 26, 2011), http://business-finance-
restructuring.weil.com/dodd-frank/fsb-issues-recommendations-on-global-resolution-
planning/#axzzlekw8HxsV (encouraging initiatives for global resolution planning but
recognizing the unlikelihood of a "comprehensive international resolution regime").
217. See generally Packin, supra note 24 (providing an analysis of many of the
remaining unanswered issues surrounding the implementation of living wills).
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the balance between effective resolution planning and minimized
regulatory burden by working with institutions and allowing the process
to develop. While it may take time, living wills could one day serve as
a valuable tool for limiting systemic risk and the problems associated
with the too-big-to-fail phenomenon.218
CLAY R. COSTNER
218. See, e.g., Avgouleas et al., supra note 22, at 2.
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